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Abstract: This article highlights two contrasting sets of images of tort that are 
dominant in UK culture. The first set reflects various aspects of the traditional 
portrayal of justice, which depicts tort as an independent ‘natural’ system of rules of 
universal application forming the foundation of a just society. The second group of 
images is more recent and relates to the perceived development of a damaging 
compensation culture. Focusing on personal injury litigation, we show, in different 
ways and to different degrees, how these portrayals differ from the reality of tort in 
practice. In explaining how tort actually operates we reveal significant features of the 
culture of tort. In practice it is heavily influenced by institutional arrangements: the 
importance of both welfare provision and liability insurance is highlighted, and the 
effects of a ‘no-win no-fee’ claims market are examined. The article reveals that the 
operation of tort is very much affected by commercial interests and the economic 
demands of the institutions which surround it. Overall we conclude that the cultural 
images of tort examined fail to reflect how the system of compensation for personal 
injury actually operates in practice. 
 
 
Although culture is very difficult to define,
1
 we can say that tort rules, procedures 
and institutions both reflect and help determine the broad culture of the society of 
which they are a part. Concepts such as wrongdoing, causation, compensation and 
justice depend upon a cluster of popular beliefs and attitudes which are in turn 
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moulded by the legal system.
2
 To help with problems of definition, Nelken suggests: 
„Legal culture, in its most general sense, is one way of describing relatively stable 
patterns of legally oriented social behaviour and attitudes.‟3 One aim of this article is 
to illustrate how the tort system reflects particular social institutions and practices. 
But a more important theme is in conflict with this aim: we point to a dissonance 
between social attitudes and the reality of the tort system in practice. That is, we 
examine perceptions of tort derived from commonly held views about how the system 
of justice ought to operate and we contrast how tort, in practice, often does not 
correspond to these views. 
This article is written in two parts. In the first part we consider images of tort 
deriving from traditional portrayals of justice. We set out seven commonly held views 
about the operation of the personal injury litigation system and then we contrast what 
actually happens in practice. We note the rhetoric and the social attitudes derived 
from long-held cultural views of how the legal system is supposed to operate and we 
then compare the reality. We start by reflecting upon the scope of tort principles. Next 
we consider who brings and defends personal injury cases and what role is played by 
courts and judges in their resolution. We then consider how the key principle of fault 
is interpreted in practice and how the operation of insurance affects traditional 
perceptions of how justice is delivered. Finally, we look at the reasons why damages 
are awarded and what amounts are paid. Overall, we set out the seven commonly held 
views of tort and then, by examining the actual practice of personal injury, we 
undermine them. 
In the second part of this article we look at another set of images which contrast 
with those set out in the first part. These images portray the tort system in a very 
critical way, depicting it as a burden that undermines rather than underpins society. It 
is widely perceived that tort has encouraged a damaging compensation culture. Our 
propensity to claim is said to have increased to such an extent that we can no longer 
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accept personal responsibility for our misfortunes. The system is thought to be awash 
with unmeritorious claims which have been prompted by an ambulance-chasing 
entourage offering to work on a „no-win no-fee‟ basis. Exaggeration and fraud are to 
the fore and non-existent or unmeritorious injuries are compensated. As in the first 
part of the article, although with less force, we then show how these images have 
become distorted from reality. In particular, the majority of injured people still do not 
go on to claim compensation despite being encouraged to do so through widespread 
„no-win no-fee‟ advertising. The exception arises in the context of road traffic 
accidents, where there is a strong culture of claiming. The significant increase in the 
number of personal injury claims over the last forty years is largely attributable to an 
increase of such claims. Whilst the extent of spurious and fraudulent claiming has 
generally been exaggerated, again, in the context of road traffic accidents complaints 
have more foundation. We examine why such a strong culture of claiming has 
developed in the context of road traffic accidents as compared with other types of 
claim. In conclusion, having shown how traditional and modern portrayals of tort 
differ from the reality, we show how tort in practice is heavily influenced by 
institutional arrangements.  
The scope of this article is limited in so far as it examines only the role of tort in 
providing compensation for personal injury. Of course we are aware of the much 
wider scope that exists for tort claims. But if we were also to consider, for example, 
culture in relation to defamation and freedom of speech, or in relation to nuisance and 
the environment, we could not have constructed the present coherent framework for 
analysis. We are content with our present, more limited focus of study: after all 
personal injury litigation is by far the most significant area of tort for the everyday 
work of the legal profession in the UK and many other countries. 
  
I. Tort and the traditional portrayal of justice  
A. Tort law is universal and applies to all accidents and injuries  
A powerful image of the traditional portrayal of justice is that of the universal 
application of the law to all citizens. All are equally subject to the law and all can 
equally benefit or be penalised by it. To law students this is reinforced early in their 
study of tort by the analysis given of the negligence formula. They are told that one of 
 4 
the reasons for the success of that cause of action is that it can potentially apply to all 
sorts of accidents and injuries. In addition, the formula itself is a relatively simple 
one: instructions to juries based upon finding liability using the „reasonable man‟ 
formula were easy to give and understand no matter how complex the situation. 
Similarly, the „neighbour‟ test used by judges to determine whether a duty of care was 
owed has a superficial simplicity and appears capable of being used in very diverse 
circumstances.  
In reality the actual scope of actions in tort for personal injury is severely limited. 
Only certain types of injury are likely to attract compensation. This is because the 
claims brought are much affected by the incidence of compulsory insurance so that 
the accidents that are compensated closely match the areas where liability insurance is 
to be found. Road and work accidents predominate because those are the two major 
areas where tort insurance is compulsory.
4
 In 2011 - 2012 they constituted 88% of all 
the claims that were brought for personal injury, with motor accidents comprising 
80%
5
 of the total and employers‟ liability 8%.6 They dominate the practice of tort 
even though they constitute, at best, only about a half of all accidents,
7
 and some 
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surveys suggest that they are much less important than this.
8
 More common accidents 
are those in the home, or suffered in the course of leisure activities or in playing sport, 
and yet very few of these result in any damages award.
9
 It was estimated that there 
were 7.8 million accidents in the home in 1999 but in only 0.5% of these was there 
the potential for a successful tort claim.
10
 Therefore, although work and transport 
injuries dominate the tort system, they are not representative of accidents in general. 
All this means that the place where you are injured is crucial. Accidents in areas 
not covered by liability insurance are extremely unlikely to be compensated. 
According to one study conducted over thirty years ago, whereas one in four road 
accident victims and one in ten work accident victims were compensated in tort, only 
one in 67 injured elsewhere did so.
11
 Overall, only one accident victim in 16 who was 
incapacitated for three days or more was compensated by the tort system. However, if 
we concern ourselves only with serious injuries, tort was much more important: where 
an accident caused incapacity for work for six months or more, almost a third of 
victims received tort damages. However, this increased significance of tort was then 
severely undermined: the importance of the tort system is reduced tenfold if account 
is taken of those suffering disablement not from accidents alone, but from all causes, 
including congenital illness and disease.
12
 For a variety of reasons this group is much 
less able to claim in tort than accident victims,
13
 and common law damages plays an 
even more limited role in their compensation.  
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The limited scope of tort compensation can be contrasted with the much wider 
ambit of the welfare state. Although only a small part of public expenditure upon 
welfare is paid to accident victims,
14
 the amount greatly exceeds the total damages 
paid by the tort system. In reality tort is very much the „junior partner‟ of the social 
security system.
15
 The Pearson Commission in 1978 found that seven times as many 
accident victims received social security payments as opposed to tort damages for 
their injuries and that the total benefit obtained by them was double the sum of all 
damages awarded.
16
 
These figures must not be taken to imply that the tort and social security systems 
are mutually exclusive; in fact they are closely linked. The person who succeeds in his 
damages claim is more likely to be in receipt of a wider range of welfare benefits than 
the more typical accident victim who is unable to claim in tort.
17
 The existence of the 
welfare state has provided injured people with the basic sustenance needed to undergo 
the sometimes lengthy process of pursuing a claim for damages at common law. If 
accident victims had not been able to obtain this immediate support from the benefit 
system it is unlikely that the action for common law damages – with all its delays, 
costs and complexity – would have survived long in the twentieth century. For that 
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reason the tort system can be seen as parasitic upon the welfare state. It is similarly 
dependent upon liability insurance.
18
 This is far from the image of tort as an 
independent „natural‟ system of rules of universal application supposedly forming the 
foundation of a just society. Tort in practice is limited in its scope, partial in its 
application and very dependent upon existing systems of welfare and insurance 
administration. 
B. Tort claims for personal injury are often brought and defended by individuals 
This image seems largely self-evident. Corporations cannot suffer personal injury, 
only individuals can, and although many of them will seek to attribute responsibility 
to their employer or the state or other complex body, the majority will name another 
individual as liable for their injury. Tort case names are replete with the surnames of 
individuals; organisations appear much less frequently. This individualism is said to 
be one of the most distinctive features of tort. When combined with a subjective 
approach in the assessment of loss and claimant need, this individualism is said to 
make tort distinct from the provision for injury made by the welfare state. However, 
this image of tort again needs to be qualified considerably when viewed from the 
perspective of practice. 
1. Defendants 
Let us first consider those who are the real defendants in the great majority of 
cases: the insurers. They are the paymasters of the tort system and are responsible for 
94% of tort compensation for personal injury.
19 
Although not named in the law reports 
and therefore rarely mentioned in tort textbooks, they are the „elephant in the living 
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room.‟20 That is, they are almost always present and dominate proceedings, and yet 
judges and jurists rarely discuss this fact.
21
 Although it is true that the majority of 
claims for injury are brought against defendants who are individual people, almost all 
of them are insured against their liability. Similarly, most employers, companies and 
organisations who are sued are also insured. The result is that in nine out of ten cases 
the real defendants are insurance companies, with the remainder comprising large 
self-insured organisations or public bodies, such as government departments and 
health authorities. It is extremely rare indeed for an uninsured individual to be the real 
defendant.  
The important centres of personal injury practice are therefore insurers‟ buildings, 
rather than courts of law, or even lawyers‟ offices. In the last decade the number of 
such insurance centres has declined because of company mergers and greater 
specialisation. The work has been concentrated in particular localities. Consolidation 
in the general liability insurance market has resulted in it being dominated by only 
eight major companies, although there are more than fifty other smaller firms issuing 
policies.
22
 More than half of the larger general insurers are foreign-owned.
23
 For 
motor insurance there were over 350 companies authorised to transact motor 
insurance but only 65 companies and 11 Lloyds syndicates actively did so. The ten 
largest motor insurers control three quarters of the market.
24
 Thus the more than a 
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million people who suffered personal injury last year and brought tort claims came up 
against very few real defendants. 
Policyholders in practice cede complete control over their case to their insurer and 
thereafter usually play little or no part in the litigation process. For example, Harry 
Street, the late Professor of Law at Manchester University and author of Street on 
Torts, revealed that he was once a defendant in a case but only discovered that it had 
been determined on appeal when he read about it in a newspaper.
25
 He had played no 
part in the proceedings. Insurers in practice determine the litigation tactics that are 
used and how any defence is to be conducted. This means, for example, that they 
commonly make admissions without the consent of the insured,
26
 and they can settle 
cases in spite of objection from the policyholder.
27
 Further examples of the insurer‟s 
control over a personal injury case are given below. 
2. Claimants 
When we consider claimants, it cannot be contested that the individual named in 
the lawsuit is the person who has suffered injury. However, bringing a tort action is 
also very much influenced by the insurance background to the claim. Here we 
concentrate upon claimants‟ abilities to appoint their own legal representation in order 
to bring the claim. We know that most tort defendants are liability insurance 
policyholders and have no choice in the law firm appointed to defend them; if they 
wish to take advantage of the indemnity provided by the policy they must accept the 
representation provided. It might be thought that claimants, in contrast, have complete 
freedom to choose their own lawyer. However, this is far from the case. 
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The reason for the limited choice lies in the rapid expansion in recent years of 
before-the-event (BTE) insurance.
28
 This is the claimant‟s own insurance against 
future legal costs that he took out before the accident which caused him injury. It is 
sometimes referred to as legal expenses insurance. Almost three in five adults now 
have some form of this insurance.
29
 Over 18 million drivers hold it as part of their 
motor insurance and 14 million householders as part of their buildings and contents 
insurance. In total these number about 22 million people.
30
 In addition, for example, 
about 7 million workers are entitled to BTE benefits resulting from their trade union 
membership, although this is a declining number. This wide penetration of the market 
has been achieved largely because BTE has been sold as an additional benefit to be 
included in existing motor liability or household insurance. In effect, there has been a 
great deal of inertia selling. Few people opt to take out stand-alone BTE policies, but 
they commonly accept legal expenses cover as part of a wider package. 
BTE limits the freedom to choose one‟s own lawyer because claimants are directed 
by the insurer to use firms which are on the insurer‟s approved panel.31 In return for 
limiting their costs and ensuring that the cases are dealt with efficiently, panel firms 
are guaranteed a constant flow of work by the insurer. Firms also pay the insurer a 
referral fee for each case received. Significant sums are thus received by the insurer 
but the referral arrangement may not be of similar benefit to the claimant. The law 
firm may be located a considerable distance from the injured person‟s home and 
resort must be had to electronic and written communications. In practice, therefore, 
the firms are not only the choice of the insurer rather than the claimant but they also 
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may not facilitate the personal assistance and contact that the claimant may need. In 
spite of this, injured people in practice are pressured into accepting a panel solicitor, 
32
 
and the claim is thus brought through an insurance sponsored lawyer. Overall, we can 
see that it is far from the case that claims in tort are either brought or defended by 
individuals as the traditional view implies. 
C. Tort claims are determined in court by judges aided by lawyers and juries 
An enduring image of tort law contained in popular views of justice is that of a 
bewigged judge, aided by similarly adorned barristers, carefully sifting the evidence 
to come to a just decision. The judge and barristers are invariably male with the latter 
distinguished by the finery of their robes. They sit in the formal surroundings of a 
courtroom, often wood-panelled, which affects in many ways the justice that is 
delivered.
33
 Behind the barristers sit a phalanx of sober suited solicitors. Some people 
may also conjure up a box of twelve people good and true to form a jury by which 
their peers are to be judged. The formality is at once respected and feared. Although 
helping to ensure impartial adjudication untainted by emotional response, the 
atmosphere is so alien to many claimants that they will do almost anything to avoid it. 
Fear of having to appear in court and face cross-examination is a major reason for 
claimants being too ready to accept the very first offer of settlement that is put to 
them. This also explains why some claims are not even pursued at all. However, it is a 
fear with little foundation because cases today are never decided by a judge and jury 
in court. The involvement of these symbols of justice is very limited when we 
consider how tort cases are actually determined. 
We have already seen that the great majority of cases are really defended by 
insurance companies. The high cost of litigation, when combined with the small size 
of claims, ensures that it is simply not economic to utilise the legal profession and its 
accoutrements in the way that the popular imagination conceives. In practice, it is 
insurers who decide whether a case merits the very exceptional treatment of being 
taken to a court hearing. A key statistic of the tort system reveals how unusual it is for 
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a court to become involved: 98% of cases are settled before they are even set down 
for trial, and, of the few that do receive a trial date, most are concluded before that 
formal hearing takes place.
34
 In one survey only 5 out of the 762 „ordinary‟ cases 
went to trial.
35
 In effect, insurers allow trial judges to determine only 1% of all the 
claims made. In these rare cases the judge receives no assistance from that other 
major symbol of popular justice: the jury. Although juries remain an important feature 
of personal injury litigation in the USA, they were abolished in the UK in all but very 
exceptional cases in 1934 having fallen into disuse many years before. A „Runaway 
Jury‟ simply cannot happen in a personal injury case in the UK.36 
If a case does reach court and is determined by a judge, the decision is unlikely to 
be challenged further. Few cases are appealed to a higher court. The result is that 
when the senior judiciary are called upon they are left to adjudicate upon a small 
fraction of what are, by then, very untypical cases indeed. Whether an appeal court is 
to be given an opportunity to examine a point of tort law may depend upon the insurer 
because, if it serves the insurer‟s purpose for doubt to remain, the claimant can be 
paid in full and threatened with a costs award if the action is continued.
37
 By their 
control of settlement tactics and which cases are taken to appeal, insurers have shaped 
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tort principles and what happens in practice. This is far from the popular image of 
how tort law has been created and what effect it has. 
If we turn our attention to cases that are settled out of court, as opposed to formally 
adjudicated, we find that it is still insurers that determine the extent that lawyers and 
formal procedures become involved. Increasingly they are seeking to settle cases at an 
early stage without resorting to the issue of court documents. In one survey of major 
insurers it was estimated that, because of earlier settlement, the number of cases 
disposed of only after the issue of formal proceedings had declined by a third.
38
 Of 
course it has always been the case that the great majority of claims are settled 
informally: over thirty years ago 86% of cases were being settled without formal 
proceedings in the form of a writ being issued.
39
 Now even more cases are being 
settled at an early stage.  
Insurers are avoiding not only judges, courts, and court procedures but also 
lawyers. Defence lawyers are being bypassed and more work is being done in-house 
by insurers. In addition, in an effort to increase specialisation and cut costs, insurers 
have tried to ensure that fewer law firms act for them. For example, in 2004, AXA 
insurance company announced that it had reduced by half the number of law firms 
defending its cases. Similarly, over a period of four years, the Zurich insurance 
company decimated the number of firms representing its policyholders in catastrophic 
cases: only four firms now defend such cases for this large insurer. Much of the work 
being done in personal injury law firms is now being carried out by unqualified or 
partly qualified paralegal personnel. It is feared that, as a result of proposed reforms, 
non-lawyers at claims management firms could be left in charge of even complex 
personal injury claims.
40
 The image of tort law as being regularly administered by 
highly trained lawyers in a formal environment is thus very far from the reality. 
D. Tort liability is largely dependent upon proof of fault and findings of law 
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The extent that popular culture requires fault to be established in order for liability 
to be found is uncertain. It is clear that wrongdoing has been the fundamental force 
which has justified the continued expansion of the law of tort. However, the notion of 
responsibility goes far beyond that of fault and this is reflected in the strict liability 
regimes found in the law of tort. These areas of non-fault liability are usually limited 
in their practical effect but have widespread popular support especially in the area 
involving injuries at work. For example, it has been shown that people commonly 
think that employers should pay for injuries caused to their workforce even in the 
absence of any fault on their part.
41
 However, overall the fault principle plays a major 
role in determining the popular response as to whether compensation should be paid. 
In the absence of fault, for example, property owners are rarely found liable. The fault 
principle has a great effect upon students of the law of tort because of the 
disproportionate emphasis it receives in tort textbooks. Common law negligence is the 
core element of tort teaching; strict liability, especially if deriving from statute, is a 
neglected area of study. As a result, the standard response to the inquiry „is 
compensation payable?‟ very often is „it depends whether fault can be proven.‟ 
However, the hold that fault maintains over the popular and student response 
towards compensation in tort is not reflected in the actual practice of law. Via liability 
insurance, tort in practice provides a structure for processing mass payments of small 
amounts of compensation. In processing these routine claims insurers decide which 
elements of damage they will accept or contest. The key fact here is that it is unusual 
for them to contest liability; one study revealed that insurers‟ files „contained 
remarkably little discussion of liability,‟ finding it initially denied in only 20% of 
cases.
42
 Most claims are of low value and not worth contesting and, as a result, 
insurers make at least some payment in the great majority of them. Only very rarely 
do they insist upon staging a gladiatorial contest to determine whether a particular 
defendant was in the wrong. Contrary to the impression gained from tort textbooks, 
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duty of care, causation of damage, and even breach of duty are generally not in 
dispute in cases processed by the system. 
Another element in establishing liability, at least in law student consciousness, is 
the importance of findings of law. Appeal cases are read one after another in order to 
distil the essence of what may be required to advise a client correctly and succeed in a 
claim. However, in practice, reference to the refined discussions of law which take 
place in the appellate courts rarely features in the everyday work of the personal 
injury practitioner. In road accident cases it has been shown that driving skills and 
common sense exercised within the scope of the „rules of the road‟ are of much more 
importance than any legal principle. To emphasise this further, we can say that it is 
the facts rather than the law that are much more likely to determine the case.
43
 One 
barrister surveyed memorably commented that an excuse for not reading the papers 
for the case in detail in advance of a hearing was that the facts revealed in court would 
inevitably change: 
You can only say how it looks on the evidence you have got at the initial stage, which is very 
rarely the picture that will emerge at the trial. There used to be a chap in these chambers whose 
motto was, „Never mind about the law, it will all be decided on the facts, and never mind the 
facts because that will all have changed by the time your client comes out of the witness box 
anyway.‟
44
 
 
E. Tort cases reflect the justice requirements of due process and fairness 
As we have already seen the popular image of the delicately balanced scales of 
justice held by the goddess of justice needs close examination when it comes to 
considering what happens in the typical tort case. The right to representation and to 
control the way in which a claim is litigated have already been discussed. Here we 
consider further the factors that are influential in disposing of a claim and contrast 
them with the traditional portrayal of justice. 
We have seen above that it is the facts found rather than the law in the books that 
are more important in determining the result of a claim. But how are those facts 
 
43
 H Genn, Hard Bargaining (1987) 73. 
44
 Ibid, 74. 
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found? The traditional image is of a rigorous, impartial, and detailed investigation into 
what happened. In a road accident we might imagine there will be a careful forensic 
examination of the scene by experts in determining the cause of injury. The effects of 
speed, weather, the road surface and layout, vehicle design and so on will be carefully 
weighed. Witness statements from many potential parties will be taken and police 
reports will be scrutinised. Thereafter this evidence will be subject to cross 
examination in court to assess its probative value, this being done according to the 
strict rules of evidence. At each juncture the parties will be able to question and test 
the views put forward and submit their alternative views within the limits of the rules 
of civil procedure, which aim at providing a fair hearing for all. 
The reality is very far from this idealised image. Classic empirical studies reveal 
that, in practice, it is insurance bureaucracy that largely dictates what facts are 
accepted, how the litigation proceeds, and whether, when, and for how much, claims 
are settled.
45
 Ross, in particular, found that the rules of tort were transformed when 
they came to be used in the system in three ways: firstly, they were simplified; 
secondly, they were made more liberal and thirdly, they were made more 
inequitable.
46
 Let us explain each of these features in turn, and reflect upon how the 
facts in most cases are actually found. 
In practice, the rule that fault must be proven is too uncertain to apply to the 
individual circumstances of particular accidents. The rule has to be simplified and the 
facts found easily in order to process the claim. For reasons of cost and administrative 
efficiency, insurers have been forced to substitute other criteria for the theoretical tort 
analysis. Mechanical rules of thumb replace any detailed investigation into blame. For 
example, in practice the driver of the car that runs into the back of another is 
invariably found to be the one who is negligent. Similarly, the driver of the car 
emerging from the junction is the one presumed to be at fault for the ensuing 
 
45
 See Genn (fn 43), Harris et al (fn 9) and, in the USA context, HL Ross, Settled Out of Court (1980). 
The major findings are supported by more recent empirical studies and, in particular, by 
Goriely/Moorhead/Abrams (fn 26). But see the critique of Genn‟s work in R Dingwall et al, Firm 
Handling: The Litigation Strategies of Defence Lawyers in Personal Injury Cases (2000) 20 LS 1. 
46
 Ross, ibid.  
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collision. There is neither the time nor resources to instruct experts to analyse the 
scene of each road accident and precisely calculate the series of events leading to the 
accident: what really happened, what the parties did and might have done, receives 
little examination. Ross concludes:
47
 „The price paid is reduction of any meaningful 
consideration of fault and the substitution of mechanical presumption for scientifically 
based investigation‟. 
Economic pressures mean that cases are disposed of on the basis of very limited 
paperwork alone, and this may bear only a limited relationship to what actually 
occurred. If a case gets to court it has been argued that the findings of fact are so 
uncertain that you might as well toss a coin to determine the result.
48
 Although these 
generalisations about how the facts are found and how litigation is conducted do not 
apply to all insurers for every type of case,
49
 they reveal that the basis upon which 
claims are decided is very different from the image of justice which emphasises due 
process considerations in determining what really happened. 
One effect of these pressures upon insurers to dispose of cases efficiently is that the 
system is very much more liberal than it may appear. Ross revealed that many more 
claims succeeded than the strict rules of tort − emphasising the need to prove fault − 
would allow. Often insurers pay something for claims which, if they were to be fully 
investigated, would be without legal foundation. As a result „wherever there is 
insurance there is … a closer approximation to the objectives of social insurance in 
fact than the doctrines of tort law would lead one to suppose.‟50 
However, Ross also found that this liberality is but part of a system which overall 
is weighted in favour of insurers and results in much inequality. Indeed the case often 
used to illustrate the general inequalities in the legal system involves a „one-shotter‟ 
 
47
 Ibid, 100. 
48
 Elliott/Street (fn 25) 243.  
49
 Dingwall et al (2000) 20 LS 1. 
50
 FV Harper/FG James, The Law of Torts (1956) s 13.7. 
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accident victim suing a „repeat player‟ insurer.51 Delay, uncertainty, financial need 
and other pressures cause claimants to accept sums much lower than a judge would 
award. The eagerness of claimants and their solicitors to get something from the 
system is reflected in the fact that, in the past, in two out of every three cases they 
accepted the very first formal offer made to them by the „risk neutral‟ insurer.52 Those 
claimants who can withstand the pressures of litigation do better than those who 
cannot, with the result that those from a higher social class or wealthier background 
are more likely to succeed.
53
 Those who suffer most are the severely injured. 
Although in the greatest need, they will find their high value claim scrutinised in 
detail and processed very differently from the average case which typically involves 
but a minor upset and little, if any, financial loss. Those seriously injured are much 
less likely to receive „full‟ compensation than those suffering minor injury. By 
contrast, the great majority of claimants quickly recover from their minor injury and, 
for a variety of reasons, are likely to emerge over-compensated for their economic 
loss.
54
 
The overall result of the settlement system is that rough and ready justice is 
dispensed, much influenced by insurance company personnel and procedures, and 
driven by the needs of the insurance industry and the cost of the legal process. The 
system produces arbitrary results and bears only a limited relationship to the portrayal 
of justice contained in the traditional tort textbook. 
 
51
 The seminal article is M Galanter, Why the „Haves‟ Come out Ahead (1974) 9 Law and Society 
Review (L & Soc Rev) 95. However, Dingwall et al (2000) 20 LS 1 emphasise that not all 
defendants in personal injury cases are „repeat players‟, and they should not be treated as a 
homogenous group. Other limits of the article were examined in an anniversary special issue in 
(1999) 33 L & Soc Rev 795. 
52
 Harris et al (fn 9) table 3.3. Although a more recent study discloses more bargaining, almost a third 
of cases still settled after only one offer, and two thirds settled after two. Goriely/Moorhead/Abrams 
(fn 26) 154. Leech reports that her firm accepted only a quarter of the first offers made in 540 settled 
cases:  C Leech, Better in than out, Law Society Gazette (LS Gaz) 10 (6 January 2005). 
53
 Ross (fn 45). 
54
 D Dewees/D Duff/M Trebilcock, Exploring the Domain of Accident Law: Taking the Facts Seriously 
(1996) 19. PA Bell/J O’Connell, Accidental Justice: The Dilemmas of Tort Law (1997) 63 ff. 
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F. Tort focuses upon compensating financial loss and serious injuries 
One image of tort is of a caring system that compensates those who are especially 
needy when they are suddenly struck down by misfortune. Following a serious injury, 
the claimant may become very short of money. He may be unable to work. Sooner or 
later any support from his employer will be withdrawn and he may lose his job. 
Savings, if any, will run out and reliance only upon the meagre resources provided by 
the welfare state could prove difficult. He may be unable to support his family, the 
mortgage may not be paid and the home may then come under threat. The claimant‟s 
loved ones indirectly may then be among the sufferers. In addition, the claimant‟s 
injury may need continuing care. Certain medical equipment and rehabilitation 
treatment may not easily be obtained from the National Health Service and the cost of 
providing it privately can be very high. Without financial assistance, nursing support 
may be reduced to a minimum, recovery may be delayed, and pain increased. To 
relieve these financial concerns there is the tort system. One image of tort is thus that 
it is a system which provides direct financial support which is much needed by 
recipients of compensation who are seriously injured. Who could possibly question 
this basic humanitarian function of tort law and deny its efficacy? 
Unfortunately the truth of the matter is again far removed from the picture that has 
just been painted. Firstly, it is not the case that damages in tort are predominately 
awarded to those who have been seriously injured and, secondly, financial loss 
comprises but a small part of the overall damages bill. Instead it is non-pecuniary loss 
that accounts for a disproportionate amount of damages. Pain and suffering and loss 
of amenity comprised two thirds of the total awarded thirty years ago,
55
 and it has 
remained at about that level.  
The extraordinary importance given to pain and suffering, as opposed to financial 
loss, reflects the fact that most awards are for minor injury and involve relatively 
small sums. The average payment is less than £5,000
56
 which is approximately two 
 
55
 Pearson Commission (fn 6) vol 2 table 107. 
56
 The median figure was £2,500 in the survey of 81,000 cases receiving legal aid and closed in 1996-
97 in Pleasence (fn 35) 40 fig 3.17. P Fenn/N Rickman, Costs of Low Value Liability Claims 1997-
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month‟s average salary. In these minor cases claimants suffer very little, if any, loss 
of earnings and rarely incur medical costs. Future financial loss occurs in only 7% of 
cases and amounts to less than 9% of the total damages bill.
57
 Where road accidents 
are involved, 70% of the injuries in recent years have been attributed to the effects of 
whiplash.
58
 Claimants are then often left with symptoms which are difficult to 
disprove.  
In practice, therefore, the claimants in tort who suffer catastrophic effects as a 
result of their accident are very unusual. Instead nearly all suffer very minor injuries 
and soon make a full recovery. They are not left with any continuing ill effects. In 
most cases the accident does not even result in a claim for social security benefits.
59
 It 
is these minor injury cases which account for the extraordinarily high costs of the 
system compared to the damages it pays out.
60
 But the essential point to note here is 
that the image of the tort system as caring for the immediate financial needs of mostly 
severely injured people in society is far from the reality. 
G. Tort awards full compensation for losses suffered 
 
2002 (2003), record average damages of only £3,000 for employers‟ liability accident claims, 
although this study of almost 100,000 cases related only to claims for less than £15,000. See 
Department for Constitutional Affairs, <http://www.dca.gov.uk/majrep/claims/elclaims.htm>. 
57
 Pearson Commission (fn 6) vol 2 § 44 and table 107. However, ten years ago the Association of 
British Insurers estimated that 46% of the value of claims between £100,000 and £250,000 
comprised future loss: Lord Chancellor’s Department, Courts Bill: Regulatory Impact Assessment 
(November 2002) table 8. 
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 House of Commons Transport Committee, The Cost of Motor Insurance, Fourth Report of Session 
2010-11 vol 1 (HC 591) § 16, available online at 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmtran/591/59105.htm>. 
59
 The Compensation Recovery Unit issues a nil certificate in 70% of the cases where a compensator 
intends to make a payment. See R Lewis, Deducting Benefits from Damages for Personal Injury 
(1999) § 14.05. 
60
 The figures always bear repetition. The Pearson Commission estimated that the cost of operating the 
tort system amounted to 85% of the value of tort payments distributed to claimants. See Pearson 
Commission (fn 6) vol 1 § 256. The Lord Chancellor‟s Civil Justice Review (Cm 394, 1988) 
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personal injury cases. 
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Although most injuries compensated by tort are minor a few are much more 
serious and account for a substantial amount of the damages paid. In 2002 insurers 
estimated that only 1% of all cases in the tort system resulted in a payment of 
£100,000 or more. However, these few cases were responsible for 32% of the total 
damages paid out by the system.
61
 It is these serious injuries that are more likely to 
come to public attention partly because they are more likely to go to court and be 
reported in newspapers. These accounts in the press are often written so as to suggest 
that the damages award is akin to a very large pools win. They may even give rise to 
feelings of envy in the reader because of the amount of the „windfall‟. What is rarely 
explored is the suffering and loss of the victim and how his day-to-day life has 
dramatically changed. The newspapers only rarely couple the compensation paid with 
details of the problems faced by those who have suffered, for example, spinal injury 
or brain damage. Instead the impression that is often left is that these tragic victims 
are exceptionally well cared for by society and that many of them are among the 
growing number of new millionaires. 
It is certainly true that the recipients of tort damages are much better treated 
than the majority of accident victims for the latter are left to rely upon their own 
resources as supplemented by the safety net of the welfare state.
62
 However, it is 
misleading to suggest that victims of serious injury will have all their needs met by 
the tort system. Compensation has traditionally been awarded in the form of a lump 
sum and the experience of past decades has proven that, for those who need long term 
care and support, it will prove insufficient. There are many reasons for this. 
One major factor for the erosion of the lump sum is that in its calculation too 
little allowance is made for of the effects of inflation. A discount rate is used to allow 
for the fact that the claimant will receive compensation earlier than he would have had 
he been able to work for the wages now lost. This rate has consistently been set too 
 
61
 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Courts Bill: Regulatory Impact Assessment (November 2002) 
table 1. 
62
 Even where an accident causes incapacity for work for six months or more only a third of victims 
receive tort damages: Pearson Commission (fn 6) vol 1 table 5. 
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low; it has never matched the true rate of return on investment that the claimant can 
actually achieve.
63
 At present a claimant is expected to achieve a real rate of return 
above inflation and after taxation of 2.5%. With inflation at 3.5% and taxation costs at 
a further 1%, the claimant must obtain a return of 7% at a time when the bank rate is 
as low as 0.5%. It is inevitable that any lump sum awarded will be eroded much more 
quickly than the court presumed. 
Nor have courts made enough allowance for the substantial increase in life 
expectancy that is now evident. In contrast, too much allowance has been made for 
the prospective potential earning capacity of the disabled person.
64
 All this is likely to 
result in the money proving insufficient in the long term. A final reason for under-
compensation is that the lump sum is likely to be agreed out of court and, because of 
the uncertainties of litigation, will reflect a substantial discount from what a judge 
would award. A sum less than the actual loss suffered is thus often accepted. For a 
variety of reasons, therefore, claimants are unlikely to receive „full‟ compensation and 
in practice are not returned to the position they were in before the accident. 
 
II. Tort and the modern portrayal of a compensation culture  
A. The ‘Compensation Culture’ 
Competing with the idealised (and often misleading) images of tort law considered in 
the above section is the widespread perception that tort has contributed to a damaging 
„compensation culture‟.65 Our propensity to claim is thought to have increased to such 
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an extent that we are now seeking personal injury compensation on a routine basis 
regardless of fault. The media regales us with entertaining but worrying tales of 
claims for pure accidents and for trivial injuries. Spurious and fraudulent claims are 
thought to be commonplace though complaints are also levelled at legitimate claims. 
Increased claiming is thought to represent a decline in stoicism and personal 
responsibility. As such, claimants are depicted not as the victims of wrongdoing but 
as „scroungers‟66 and „self-pitying milksops‟.67 For some, this state of affairs is 
thought to stem from longer-term developments within tort law, namely the expansion 
of tortious liability and the dilution of the fault principle to which the British are 
culturally tied.
68
 Concerns about the compensation culture are more frequently 
associated, however, with shorter-term developments within the tort system since the 
1990s: the emergence of widespread claims advertising and direct marketing; the 
introduction of „no-win no-fee‟ agreements; and the practice of paying for the referral 
of claims. 
In the 1970s, personal injury claims were handled by general practice solicitors who 
waited passively for clients‟ instructions. By the late 1990s, however, personal injury 
had become a specialist area of practice and lawyers were advertising for work.
69
 
 
Is There a Compensation Culture in the UK? (2006) 14 Torts Law Journal (TLJ) 158; R Mullender, 
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Tort Liability and Beyond (2004). 
69
 For further information on the development of the personal injury claims market, see R Abel, English 
Lawyers between Market and State: The Politics of Professionalism (2003) and H Kritzer, The 
Fracturing Legal Profession: The Case of Plaintiffs‟ Personal Injury Lawyers (2001) 8 International 
Journal of the Legal Profession 225. 
 24 
Seeing the potential in the market, claims management companies (CMCs) emerged.
70
 
CMCs realised that they could make money by recruiting clients and selling them on 
to lawyers.They engaged in mass claims advertising on television, on the radio, in 
newspapers and on billboards. They also made direct approaches to people on the 
streets, in housing estates and outside schools.
71
 Some even offered financial 
inducements to claim. Solicitors‟ conduct rules which prevented them from paying 
CMCs for the referral of claims were flouted on a regular basis and so the ban on such 
payments was lifted in 2004.
72
 In response to concerns about unethical practices, the 
government began to regulate the operation of CMCs in 2007.
73
 Whilst such 
companies can no longer make direct approaches in person, they have adapted by 
sending unsolicited text messages and making unsolicited phone calls.
74
 There are 
now 2,500 CMCs registered for personal injury work.  The market in claims has 
become big business with lawyers commonly paying between £600 and £900 for each 
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referral. Personal injury claims are now big business and lawyers commonly pay 
between £600 and £900 even for lower value claims.
75
  
This growth in claims advertising, CMCs and payments for referrals was fuelled by 
the privatisation of funding for personal injury claims in 2000. Legal aid was largely 
abolished and the use of conditional fee agreements (CFAs) was expanded.
 76
 Under 
these agreements claimant lawyers could secure an increase in their fees in each case 
that they won. They could recover up to double their costs if they were successful but 
nothing at all if they lost.
77
 Claimants themselves were encouraged to litigate under 
these „no-win no-fee‟ deals because the only financial risk to which they were 
exposed was liability for the defendant‟s costs if the case was lost. Even though in 
most cases this risk was only remote, further protection was at hand: for a suitable 
premium, insurance could be arranged so as to relieve the claimant of any concern 
over funding his claim. Damages could thus be sought at no financial risk to the 
claimant. It is widely perceived that this gave claimants no reason not to „have a go‟.78 
As such, tort is thought to have become a moral hazard. 
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The unrestrained culture of claiming thought to have stemmed from these 
developments has led to widespread concerns that tort has become a burden which is 
undermining rather than underpinning society. Organisations, businesses, public 
bodies and individuals are said to have become increasingly risk averse for fear of 
being sued. The papers carry stories of teachers refusing to take children on school 
trips, councils felling trees and volunteering in decline. Mounting claims are also 
thought to have affected the availability and affordability of liability insurance. The 
compensation culture is said to be „plundering the UK economy‟79 and „cutting a 
swathe through public service budgets‟.80 As such, in stark contrast to the traditional 
portrayal, the modern image of tort is very critical. In common with the traditional 
portrayal, however, we can point to a dissonance between perceptions of tort in 
culture and the reality in practice. 
B. Trends in our propensity to claim personal injury compensation  
1. Overview 
Whilst historical data are in short supply, those which are available support the view 
that there has been a long-term increase in the number of personal injury claims. They 
appear to have arisen four-fold since the 1970s. The Pearson Commission estimated 
that there were 250,000 claims in 1973.
81
 In 1988, the Civil Justice Review estimated 
that there were around 340,000 claims.
82
 In 2011/2002, the Compensation Recovery 
Unit (CRU) recorded just over one million claims.
83
 Established in 1989, CRU 
administers the recovery of social security benefits from tort damages and holds 
reliable data on the number of claims pursued, whether successful or unsuccessful, 
settled or litigated.
84
 Unfortunately, CRU‟s data has only been publicly available 
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since 2000 though data are available for 1997/1998.
85
 As such, it is not possible to 
track the impact of increasing claims advertising through the 1990s though it is 
possible to see the impact of the removal of legal aid and the expansion of CFAs in 
2000 and the increasing practice of paying for the referral of claims. 
 
Table 1: Personal injury claims per year (various sources) 
 
Year Number of claims Year Number of claims 
1973 (estimate) 250,000   
1988 (estimate) 340,000 2005/2006 674,422 
1997/1998 705,232 2006/2007 710,784 
2000/2001 735,931 2007/2008 732,750 
2001/2002 688,315 2008/2009 812,348 
2002/2003 706,697 2009/2010 861,325 
2003/2004 770,243 2010/2011 987,381 
2004/2005 775,875 2011/2012 1,041,150 
 
There may have been a significant increase in claims during the 1990s which levelled 
off in the 2000s, though the limited data available for 1997/1998 does not support 
this. Nevertheless, it is clear that between 2000 and 2006 when the media, politicians 
and representative groups were bemoaning our ever-increasing propensity to claim, 
the number of claims was relatively stable. In fact, the number of accident, as opposed 
to disease, claims actually declined between 2003 and 2005.
86
 It is true, however, that 
 
number of claims notified to CRU each year should largely equate with the number of personal 
injury claims being pursued. 
85
 These data were uncovered by Richard Lewis during his research for Deducting Benefits from 
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(614,126), 2002/2003 (615,546) 2003/2004 (557,186), 2004/2005 (579,282) and 2005/2006 
(629,981). 
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claims have increased annually since 2006 though it is misleading to talk about 
general trends in our propensity to claim as trends differ in accordance with the type 
of claim. 
 
2. Clinical negligence 
As can be seen from the table below, the number of clinical negligence claims has 
increased significantly since the Pearson Commission‟s estimate in 1973. 
 
Table 2: Clinical negligence claims per year (various sources)  
 
Year Number of claims Year Number of claims 
1973 (estimate) 700 2006/2007 8,575 
2000/2001 10,901 2007/2008 8,876 
2001/2002 9,779 2008/2009 9,880 
2002/2003 7,977 2009/2010 10,308 
2003/2004 7,121 2010/2011 13,022 
2004/2005 7,205 2011/2012 13,517 
2005/2006 9,321   
 
Between 2000 and 2010, however, the number of such claims fluctuated though there 
has been a significant increase in the past two years. Nevertheless, clinical negligence 
claims constitute only 1% of all personal injury claims. Moreover, there does not 
appear to be a strong culture of claiming in this context. The Department of Health 
has suggested that there are in the region of 850,000 „adverse events‟ annually in the 
National Health Service, half of which may be avoidable.
87
 Whilst a crude measure, 
this suggests that only 3% of people with grounds for complaint go on to pursue a 
claim. 
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3. Public liability 
The Pearson Commission did not estimate the number of public liability claims 
though; at most, they stood at 28,000.
88
 
 
Table 3: Public liability claims per year (various sources)  
Year Number of claims Year Number of claims 
1973 (estimate) < 28,000 2006/2007 79,841 
2000/2001 95,883 2007/2008 79,472 
2001/2002 100,989 2008/2009 86,164 
2002/2003 109,782 2009/2010 91,052 
2003/2004 91,453 2010/2011 94,872 
2004/2005 87,247 2011/2012 104,863 
2005/2006 81,615   
    
 
Again, therefore, whilst there has been a significant increase in the long-term, in the 
short-term the number of such claims has fluctuated. It is difficult to capture data on 
the potential number of claims in this context as compared with the actual number of 
claims. Government data indicates, however, that in 2002 there were over 5 million 
home and leisure accidents that caused a serious enough injury to warrant a visit to 
hospital.
89
 This includes approximately 520,000 accidents on an urban road, street or 
 
88
 The Pearson Commission estimated that there were 28,000 personal injury claims „other‟ than road 
traffic accident, employers‟ liability and clinical negligence claims. This included personal injury 
claims in the following categories: products and services (excluding medical services), occupiers‟ 
liability claims and „other‟. See Pearson Commission (fn 6) vol 2 table 11. 
89
 These data estimates are derived from the Home Accident Surveillance System (HASS) and Leisure 
Accident Surveillance System (LASS) run by the Department of Industry, both of which closed in 
2003. The data are now available from the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents: 
<http://www.hassandlass.org.uk/query/reports.htm>. 
 30 
pavement (excluding road traffic accidents), 58,000 accidents in a shopping area, 
22,500 accidents in business or leisure public buildings, 244,500 accidents in schools, 
38,000 in public playgrounds and 44,000 accidents in public houses. Whilst it is 
impossible to estimate the number of such accidents involving an element of 
negligence, it is clear that the number of accidents occurring in public spaces is very 
much larger than the number of public liability claims. 
 
4. Employers’ liability (accident and disease) 
Between 2000 and 2005, the number of employers‟ liability claims fluctuated 
considerably. This was largely due to trends in disease claims and the establishment in 
1999 of a temporary special scheme of compensation for respiratory diseases. This 
scheme closed in 2004 and since then the number of employers‟ liability claims has 
fallen each year. 
 
Table 4: Employers‟ liability claims per year (various sources) 
Year Number of claims Year Number of claims 
1973 (estimate) 117,600 2006/2007 98,478 
2000/2001 219,183 2007/2008 87,198 
2001/2002 170,554 2008/2009 86,957 
2002/2003 183,342 2009/2010 78,744 
2003/2004 291,210 2010/2011 81,470 
2004/2005 253,502 2011/2012 87,350 
2005/2006 118,692   
 
Whilst there was an increase in claims in 2011/2012, there are still fewer employers‟ 
liability claims today than in 1973. Whilst arguably this accords with increased health 
and safety at work, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) states that in 2010/2011 
115,379 injuries resulting in three or more days off work were reported by employers 
and 1.2 million working people suffered from a work-related illness, half a million of 
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which arose that year.
90
 On the basis of HSE statistics, the Trade Union Congress 
estimates that only one in ten people injured at work go on to claim compensation.
91
  
 
5. The dissonance between the modern image of tort and reality 
A dissonance has arisen between the modern image of tort and reality in several 
respects. Firstly, whilst there has been a moderate long term increase in the number of 
clinical negligence, public liability and employers‟ liability claims, this increase has 
not been sustained in the employers‟ liability context. There were fewer employers‟ 
liability claims in 2010/2011 than in 1973. Secondly, the perception that claims 
advertising, „no-win no-fee‟ agreements and payments for referrals have led to 
increasing numbers of claims since the late 1990s is misplaced. In view of the number 
of accidents that could lead to claims, the culture of claiming in the UK is relatively 
weak in the clinical, employment and public context. Thirdly, the notion that we are 
more willing to claim for trivial injuries than in the past is unsupported by evidence. 
As outlined above (section I.F), although it is true that the majority of claims involve 
minor injuries with a value of less than £5,000, this has long been the case.
92
 Fourthly, 
concerns that spurious claims are commonplace are exaggerated. Inevitably there are 
spurious and fraudulent claims within the system. There have been particular concerns 
in respect of public liability claims. In a 2004 survey, 68% of councils reported an 
increase in the number of tenuous and fraudulent claims for compensation.
93
 Such 
evidence is anecdotal, however, and the extent of spurious claiming remains unclear. 
Claims have not increased substantially since 2000 and this implies that developments 
within the tort system have not led to widespread spurious claiming. 
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Fifthly, in light of this, it is difficult to support complaints that tort in recent years has 
become a burden as a result of increasing numbers of claims (as opposed to the 
increasing cost of claims).
94
 Indeed a government review found that complaints about 
the availability and affordability of employers‟ liability insurance had been 
exaggerated in the media and that increases in premiums that had occurred were due 
to non-tort related factors, including the under-pricing of insurance, a fall in 
investment income and the increasing cost of reinsurance following the terrorist 
attacks on 11 September 2001.
95
 In addition, the extent of risk aversion appears to 
have been exaggerated and stems to a large extent from perceptions surrounding tort 
practice rather than tort practice itself.
96
 Finally, complaints that claiming represents a 
decline in personal responsibility choose to privilege anecdotal critical accounts:  
long-term increases in claiming could equally be presented as a desirable increase in 
access to justice and defendant accountability. 
The fact that recent developments within the tort system have not increased levels of 
claiming is certainly surprising. Felstiner et al explain that claims are socially 
constructed through a process of naming, blaming and claiming.
97
 In accordance with 
this process, an individual transforms an unperceived injurious experience into a 
perceived injurious experience (names); attributes that injurious experience to the 
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fault of another individual or entity (blames) and then voices that grievance to the 
person or entity believed to be responsible (claims). The authors stress that each stage 
of the transformation is „subjective, unstable, reactive, complicated and incomplete‟.98 
Individuals name, blame and claim by perceiving, interpreting and reacting to 
circumstances and events in particular ways and a wide variety of factors will affect 
an individual‟s response to injury.99 Moreover, to move through this naming, blaming 
and claiming process, the injured must be able and willing to do so, which will not 
always be the case. Individuals may, therefore, name but not blame or blame but not 
claim. Levels of claiming depend, therefore, on the prevalence of external factors and 
conditions which affect our ability and willingness to transform injuries into claims. It 
also depends on our legal consciousness which shapes our perceptions of our ability 
to claim and informs our willingness to do so. 
Research has demonstrated that, in the past, potential claimants were unable to claim 
because they were not aware they could do so or did not know how.
100
 In addition, 
their willingness to claim was dampened by both concerns that claiming would be 
stressful, expensive and intimidating and by doubts about the utility of claiming.
101
 
We would expect widespread „no-win no-fee‟ advertising, fuelled by payments for 
referrals, to change this.
102
 Most obviously, advertising raises our awareness not only 
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of the possibility of claiming after an accident but also of how to claim. Advertising 
also seeks to increase our willingness to claim in several ways. Firstly, it may reduce 
concerns we have about claiming and seeking legal advice. The public are able to 
receive anonymous advice through phone lines, thereby removing the fear of dealing 
with lawyers face-to-face. Adverts convey the impression that claiming is quick, easy 
and stress-free by avoiding images of judges and court scenes. The claims process is 
portrayed as routine, depersonalised and administrative rather than adversarial in 
nature. In addition, using the „no-win no-fee‟ tagline, adverts seek to reassure the 
public that it will be both free and easy to obtain legal advice and representation. 
Secondly, adverts seek to reinforce the utility of claiming. They give examples of 
compensation awarded for various injuries sustained in different contexts, thereby 
highlighting the financial worth of pursuing a claim. They also imply that claims are 
frequently successful. Finally, adverts seek to create a sense of entitlement and talk of 
„rights‟ to compensation.103 
Nevertheless, claim rates remain low for most injuries. It is not clear from the limited 
data available whether claims advertising has not been effective in increasing our 
general ability and willingness to claim or whether it has been effective in 
encouraging us to seek legal advice but that levels of claiming are being restrained by 
lawyers on economic grounds. Whilst CFAs may remove the financial risk of 
claiming from claimants, they transfer that risk to the lawyer. Lawyers working on a 
„no-win no-fee‟ basis must have sufficient resources to invest in a claim until its 
conclusion and take the risk of not getting paid if the claim fails. There is some 
evidence of CFA lawyers screening out economically unattractive claims as a result, 
although our knowledge and understanding of CFA practice is limited.
104
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6. The exception in relation to road traffic accidents 
In stark contrast to other types of claim, there has been both a long-term and short-
term increase in the number of road traffic accident (RTA) claims involving personal 
injury. 
 
Table 5: Road traffic accident claims per year (various sources) 
Year Number of claims Year Number of claims 
1973 (estimate) 103,300 2006/2007 518,821 
2000/2001 401,757 2007/2008 551,905 
2001/2002 400,445 2008/2009 625,072 
2002/2003 398,892 2009/2010      674, 997 
2003/2004 374,761 2010/2011      790,999 
2004/2005 402,924 2011/2012      828,489 
2005/2006 460,097   
 
Between 2000 and 2004 the number of RTA claims actually declined but since 2004 it 
has increased each year with the result that over the last six years the total has 
doubled. This increase is largely responsible for the long-term increase in all personal 
injury claims. In 1973, RTA claims constituted 41% of all personal injury claims. By 
2000/2001, this had increased to 54% and by 2011/2012 RTA claims constituted 80 % 
of all claims. This increase has occurred despite the fact that the number of casualties 
(deaths and injuries) on the road reported to the police is falling: only 222,146 road 
casualties were reported to the police in 2009, being far below the number of claims 
pursued that year.
105
 The Department for Transport acknowledges, however, that not 
all casualties are reported to the police and estimates that the actual number of road 
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casualties each year stands at 730,000.
106
 This still indicates, however, that a large 
majority of people injured in RTAs go on to claim compensation. There is clearly a 
strong culture of claiming in this context. 
Whilst there has been some exaggeration, it is generally accepted that the increased 
number of RTA claims in recent years is causing problems with the affordability and 
availability of car insurance.
107
 In addition, concerns surrounding the quality of RTA 
claims appear to have a stronger foundation. It seems that the increase in claims is 
largely attributable to an increase in whiplash claims, which reportedly constitute 70% 
of all claims.
108
 By 2004, the UK already had twice the average number of whiplash 
claims compared with other European countries and since then the number of RTA 
claims has doubled.
109
 Whiplash injuries can result in chronic disability though many 
whiplash claims involve only trivial injuries from low-impact collisions and result in 
only short periods of severe pain, require no medical treatment and result in no 
absence from work.
110
 Whilst data are in short supply, it does seem that we are more 
likely to claim for a trivial injury after an RTA than in other contexts. 
In addition, it also appears we are more likely to engage in fraud in the RTA context. 
The problem is that whiplash may be established in many cases on the basis of a 
medical report which simply confirms that somebody has reported pain after an 
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accident. Whilst many whiplash claims will be genuine there is evidence of organised 
criminals staging or inducing collisions. The Insurance Fraud Bureau estimates that 
there were 30,000 staged accidents in 2009.
111
 Given the non-demonstrable nature of 
the injury, there are also understandable concerns about opportunistic fraud, that is, 
where there has been an accident but the claimant pretends to have suffered from 
whiplash or exaggerates the symptoms. There are also instances of so-called „phantom 
passengers‟ pretending to have been injured in a car or bus that has been involved in 
an accident.
112
 Whilst there is much disagreement about the extent of the problem 
even claimant representatives have expressed their concern.
113
 
This analysis raises a number of questions. Given we are all exposed to the same „no-
win no-fee‟ advertising and the same funding mechanisms are available for RTAs as 
for other types of claim, why has such a strong culture of claiming developed after an 
RTA so that such claims have come to dominate the tort system? Why do we appear 
to be more likely to pursue trivial and/or fraudulent claims in this context? In the first 
part of this article, we explained how compulsory insurance has influenced the types 
of claims pursued within the tort system but why have RTA claims increased 
significantly when employers‟ liability claims have not? 
Traditionally, one of the reasons why people were more likely to claim after an 
accident at work or on the road than in other contexts was because they were much 
more likely to come into contact with someone who advised them of the possibility of 
claiming.
114
 Whilst in the case of work accidents this advice usually came from a 
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trade union, in the RTA context the advice came from a wider range of sources, 
including the police, breakdown companies, insurers, friends and relatives. This 
advice from third parties was important in providing reassurance not just about the 
strength of a claim but also of the appropriateness of claiming. 
Arguably, those involved in an RTA may have a higher propensity to claim because 
the nature of the problem means they are more able and willing to move through the 
naming, blaming and claiming process than in other contexts. The identity of the 
defendant is usually clear and the cause of the accident and injury are easy to 
ascertain. In addition, because we are all familiar with driving, we are better able to 
assess whether negligence has occurred than in other contexts. Whilst we may be in a 
relationship with the driver at fault, any claim is less likely to damage that 
relationship than in the clinical or employment setting. Although the defendant in 
practice is an insurance company, the fact that the wrongdoer is an individual just like 
the claimant may make claiming less intimidating. Also, because we deal with car 
insurance ourselves, we are more familiar with the process if something goes wrong. 
All of these factors may play a role and, as a result, it may be that widespread „no-win 
no-fee‟ advertising has been more effective in encouraging us to claim in this context. 
However, the strong culture of claiming can also be attributed to the following three 
inter-related institutional factors. 
 
a) Those involved in an RTA are more likely to be contacted directly soon after 
the accident and encouraged to claim. 
For most types of accident the claims market usually waits for potential claimants to 
contact them in response to their advertising. However, it is much more pro-active in 
relation to RTAs. Those involved are very likely to be contacted by a CMC and/or 
lawyer soon after the accident and encouraged to claim. This is because it is easier for 
the claims market to discover who has been involved in an RTA. Garages, breakdown 
companies and those involved in providing replacement vehicles sell on to CMCs the 
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details of those who have suffered damage.
115
 Some CMCs have also engaged in data-
mining by recovering the names and addresses of people referred to CMCs but who 
did not claim at the time. They also obtain data from insurance comparison websites 
to pick up details of those who declared they had had an accident in the last three 
years.
116
 
Surprisingly, lawyers also receive details of potential RTA claimants from liability 
insurers. Whilst insurers have expressed concern that the payment of referral fees 
adds to the cost of resolving claims, some have decided to reduce their costs by 
selling on details of non-fault motorists who inform them of an accident on their 
policy.
117
 Indeed some insurers download their data to telesales companies who 
contact those involved in accidents to ascertain whether they are injured.
118
 Although 
the practice of paying for referrals has been in place for some time, the lifting of the 
ban in 2004 may go some way to explaining the increase in RTA claims since then. 
„Third party capture‟ may also have contributed to this upward trend: from about 
2005 insurers have tried to reduce the cost of resolving claims by making direct 
contact with those injured by their policyholders and offering them a settlement 
before they engage legal advice.
119
 There are even stories of accident victims being 
contacted by several different sources to encourage them to claim.
120
 The system of 
encouraging people to claim after an RTA is therefore now highly institutionalised 
and efficient when compared to other accidents.   
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b) The process for resolving RTAs is quicker, simpler and more routinised than 
that in place for other types of claim and has a higher rate of success. 
As outlined in the first part of this article, the majority of claims are settled by 
insurers without the involvement of the courts. In order to process large numbers of 
low-value claims efficiently and economically, insurers have developed bureaucratic 
methods of handling claims. The role of fault has become diluted in practice and the 
system has become more liberal than if all cases went to court. The result is that RTA 
claims have a high success rate. As the number of RTA claims has increased over the 
years, so insurers‟ mechanisms for processing them have become more routinised and 
streamlined. This culminated in 2010 with the establishment of a „portal‟ for RTA 
claims of up to £10,000 which provides swift, early electronic exchange of relevant 
claims information between claimant lawyers and insurers.
121
 
Highly institutionalised remedy systems that are well known and readily available 
generally lead to higher rates of claiming for several reasons.
122
 They legitimise 
action by impliedly recognising „the frequency and importance of a problem as well 
as the appropriateness of action taken in response to it‟.123 They imply that claims are 
frequently successful so that it is worth having a go and they make claiming quick, 
cheap and stress-free and so reduce concerns about claiming. Finally, they can also 
encourage opportunistic and organised fraud because claims are not rigorously 
scrutinised or defended. 
 
c) RTA claims are financially attractive to the legal services market. 
The process for resolving RTA claims is very much a matter of routine. As a result 
they are financially attractive to lawyers because they can process them quickly and 
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cheaply. RTA claims are particularly attractive to the CFA market compared with 
more complex claims. Lawyers have reported that the way to make money is to have 
„a regular throughput of small, easy cases‟ requiring only low investment to 
proceed.
124
 Because lawyers acting on a CFA basis are not paid until the conclusion 
of the claim it is also important that claims are resolved quickly. RTA claims fit this 
profile. Not only do they have a high rate of success meaning that the risk of „no-fee‟ 
is very low, but their legal and factual simplicity means that they require only low 
investment and they are resolved quickly, thereby minimising problems with cash 
flow. In order to make money out of RTA claims on a CFA basis, however, it is 
necessary to process such claims in bulk using standardised documents and 
procedures. This increases the incentive for lawyers and CMCs to invest in the 
generation of RTA claims through direct contact and data-mining. 
Overall, therefore, the process of encouraging, processing and resolving RTA claims 
is heavily institutionalised when compared to other types of claim.  In addition, given 
their financial attractiveness, RTA claims have become more of a commodity. Whilst 
the impact of advertising is unclear, CFAs and payments for referral have certainly 
played a role in increasing our propensity to claim after an RTA. A circular process 
has occurred whereby demand has driven supply and supply has driven demand. It is 
clear that our propensity to claim compensation depends as much on institutionalised 
ways of handling different types of dispute as upon broader cultural propensities to 
litigate.
125
 Practices of claiming encouraged by this institutionalisation inevitably, 
however, feed into and become embedded in our wider culture. With claiming after an 
RTA becoming increasingly common, the experiences of other people may encourage 
us to claim because we feel that they are no more deserving.
126
 We may naturally 
think about compensation after an accident and even come to expect it.
127
 The overall 
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result is that a stronger „cultural link‟ has developed between RTAs, injury and 
compensation. 
 
III. Conclusion 
In this article we have outlined two sets of images of tort that are dominant in culture. 
The first set reflects various aspects of the traditional portrayal of justice. In contrast, 
the second group of images is more recent and relates to the development of a 
compensation culture. We have shown, in different ways and to different degrees, 
how these portrayals differ from the reality of tort in practice. In explaining how tort 
operates we have revealed significant features of the culture of tort. We have shown 
that tort in practice is heavily influenced by institutional arrangements. In the first part 
of the article we highlighted the influence of both welfare and insurance; in the 
second part our focus was upon the influence of the „no-win no-fee‟ claims market 
which has developed in recent years. As a whole, the article shows how the operation 
of tort is heavily influenced by the commercial interests and economic demands of the 
institutions which surround it. In relation to the modern image, the commercial 
imperative of the claims market is well-known although it is much exaggerated 
outside the context of road traffic accidents. In relation to the traditional portrayal, 
however, the influence of insurance remains hidden and much under-estimated. 
Whilst the media ignore reality in favour of entertaining but worrying „tort tales‟ of 
greedy claimants and ambulance-chasing lawyers, tort scholars continue to ignore 
reality in favour of theory and doctrine. They have done little to dispel the many 
myths. Cultural images of tort fail to reflect how the system of compensation for 
personal injury actually operates in practice. 
 
